Vanke’s Debate on Equity: Triangular Prism Reflecting Corporate Governance Issues of A-Share Listed Companies
Supervising Professor: Li Xuenan ; Case Researcher: Mei Xinlei [ Language available : Chinese ]

The theory of corporate governance posits that there is an agency problem between management and major shareholder of listed companies due to the separation of management and ownership rights. This issue is fully reflected in the dispute over Vanke’s equity that only ended in June this year. Two years ago, in the context of the A-share stock market crash and the enthusiasm of listed companies in A-shares, Baoneng Group’s subsidiary Foresea Life Insurance and Sheng Shenghua launched a capital attack on Vanke, a leading real estate company. This triggered Vanke’s management and major shareholders China Resources, Baoneng, Evergrande, and Shenzhen Metro to launch an all out offensive on Vanke. This case focuses on the corporate governance issues in the Vanke dispute, and analyzes this “game over rights” from the following three viewpoints: First, why did these capital “barbarians” attack, and why did Vanke’s management fail? Second, how did Vanke and former major shareholder China Resources come to an end of the road? Third, after the arrival of Shenzhen Metro as a “white knight”, what course is open to Vanke now?

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